Oil Price Dynamics and Currency-Hedging Behavior by Agudze, Komla & Ibhagui, Oyakhilome
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Oil Price Dynamics and
Currency-Hedging Behavior
Agudze, Komla and Ibhagui, Oyakhilome
February 2020
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/100949/
MPRA Paper No. 100949, posted 13 Jun 2020 09:28 UTC
Oil Price Dynamics and Currency-Hedging Behavior 
 
Komla Agudze and Oyakhilome Ibhagui 
 
February 2020 
 
 
Abstract 
 
For Korea, a major crude oil importer, we document that after crude oil prices spike, cross-currency basis swap spreads tend to tighten as the 
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1. Introduction 
When oil prices increase, how does the cross-currency basis swap spread of an oil-importing country change? This paper 
investigates how changes in oil prices influence currency-hedging behavior in Korea, one of the world’s largest oil importers. We document 
that the currency-hedging practice of buying US dollars forward in the dollar-won currency swap markets, which leads to a tighter cross-
currency basis, is stronger and more significant during periods of elevated oil prices but is considerably weak or even nonexistent when oil 
prices are depressed.  
Why Korea? We focus on South Korea for several reasons. As one of the growing industrialized economies, Korea is a major oil 
importer. According to the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), crude oil constitutes the biggest portion of Korea’s 
imports. In 2018, Korea’s oil import to GDP was near 5%, the highest relative to peers (see Fig.0). Thus, movements 
in oil prices should affect Korea and potentially trigger preemptive responses – such as currency-hedging – to mitigate 
adverse effects of variations in oil prices. As oil prices are quoted in US dollars, a persistent increase would elevate the cost of oil 
imports, especially if the exchange rates of the oil importing countries weaken relative to the US dollar. Beckmann & Czudaj (2013) show 
that elevated oil prices often go with currency depreciation for major oil-importing countries.  
 
Fig 0:  Oil imports/GDP of large oil importing countries 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
Bouri (2015) and Wang et al. (2013) note that fluctuations in commodity prices, particularly oil prices, severely affect 
asset prices and macroeconomic outcomes of importing nations. Shin, Baek & Heo (2018) argue that, as an oil importing 
nation, Korea’s imported crude oil demand is more responsive to oil price spikes than plunges, which means that a rise in 
oil prices should make oil importers to protect themselves, one of which could be an increased participation in currency 
hedging. Yet, the question of how movements in oil prices relate to changes in the dollar-won basis, which is of interest 
in risk management both in the fixed income and commodities markets, is less understood. This paper fills that gap in the 
literature. 
We use Markov switching and threshold models together with standard impulse response techniques to empirically resolve the 
important question of determining whether there is evidence that Korean oil importers engage in more hedging activity 
in the currency swap market when oil prices are high. This enables us to explore whether an increase in oil prices enlarge 
currency-hedging to the extent that it tightens the dollar-won basis.  By examining the effect of changes in oil prices on the dollar-won 
cross-currency basis swap spreads, we document that changes in dollar-won basis and oil prices are dynamically related and oil-price regime 
dependent. We show that a rise in oil prices does not necessarily induce currency hedging that tightens the dollar-won basis, which implies 
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that just about any rise in crude oil prices may not go together with tighter dollar-won basis. Instead, we find evidence that an increase in oil 
prices is associated with tighter dollar-won basis only when oil prices are in a high regime, implying that currency-hedging occurs mostly 
when oil prices have exceeded certain threshold levels which we estimate to have a median of around $55. It is at this value that the dollar-
won basis tightens in response to additional increases in oil prices. However, when oil prices are in a low regime, such as during periods when 
oil prices collapse, we find no evidence that tighter dollar-won basis is associated with increases in oil prices. Our results suggest that the desire 
to hedge against adverse exchange rate movements is low when oil prices are sufficiently low (that is, below $55), but high when oil prices 
are high. Thus, hedging behavior in the swap market is not uniform across all oil price regimes. While it is active during regimes of high oil 
prices, it is more tranquil when oil prices are in low regimes.  
In terms of the literature, while there are studies showing that Korea’s heavy oil importers engage in currency hedging 
(Yun & Kim, 2010), not much is known about how the oil-basis relationship and how it has evolved over time. 
Previous studies on the consequences of changes in oil prices have focused mainly on macroeconomic variables such as 
unemployment and inflation, other commodities market such as gold (see Zhang & Wei (2010)), exchange rates [see Hurn, 
Phillips & Shi (2016), Gomez-Gonzalez, Hirs-Garzon & Uribe (2019), Chuliá, Fernández & Uribe (2018), Baruník, 
Kočenda & Vácha (2017)] and financial markets (see  Zhang (2017), Wang & Liu, 2016; Khalfaoui, Boutahar & Boubaker, 
2015; Lee, Abood, Ghazoul, Barus, Obidzinski & Koh, 2014; Lin, Wesseh & Appiah, 2014; Hamilton, 2003).  Instead, in 
this paper, we focus on a new question to investigate the links between oil prices and cross-currency basis. 
To provide some intuition that motivates our study of the relation between changes in oil prices and the dollar-won cross-
currency basis, Fig. 1a below provides a 20-month rolling correlation between changes in oil prices and dollar-won basis. 
 
Figure 1a: Rolling correlation of changes in                                       Figure 1b: Evolution of the historical time series of 
1-year dollar-won (KRWUSD) basis and oil prices                                         1-year dollar-won (KRWUSD) basis and oil prices 
   
Source: Bloomberg, author computations. Dollar-won cross-currency basis swap spread is in basis points, monthly data 
As the graphs show, there is a negative relation between changes in oil prices and dollar-won basis in periods of low oil 
prices whereas the relation turns positive otherwise. The negative association implies that an increase in oil prices goes 
together with wider dollar-won basis, which suggests that in periods with negative association, oil importers do not hedge 
against adverse movements in exchange rates as oil prices are already depressed. On the other hand, the positive 
association between changes in oil prices and the dollar-won basis in periods of elevated oil prices suggests that additional 
increases in oil prices is associated with tighter dollar-won basis. This implies that in periods with high oil prices, hedging 
against adverse exchange rate movements is more common.  
This preliminary evidence reveals two regimes or threshold effects between changes in oil prices and the dollar-won basis: 
One regime in which changes in oil prices and dollar-won basis are positively related when oil prices are high, and another 
where they are negatively related or unrelated when oil prices are depressed. This leads us to consider a Markov switching 
model with 2 regimes – a high oil price regime corresponding to a positive dollar-basis relation and a low oil price regime 
which corresponds to a negative oil-basis relation and an inactive currency hedging. We also estimate a threshold model 
which helps us to quantify the regimes by determining the level of oil prices after which the relation between changes in 
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oil prices and dollar-won basis switches.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data on dollar-won basis and oil prices. Section 3 
presents results of the standard impulse response functions. We also present a robustness exercise to show that our findings 
generally hold strong. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2a. Data Description 
To examine the effects of fluctuations in oil prices on the cross-currency basis swap spreads for Korea, this paper uses 
monthly1 data gathered from Bloomberg. The data samples consist of observations from February 2003 to September 2019 
of dollar-won cross-currency basis swap spreads at the active 1-year maturity, movements of which capture hedging 
behavior in the swap market, Brent crude oil prices and other control variables such as exchange rates, sovereign credit 
default swaps and Libor-OIS spreads to control for the effects of dollar exchange rate pass-through, risk of sovereign default, 
and dollar funding pressure respectively. As our data samples range from 2003 to 2019, the study covers periods of 
depressed and elevated oil prices that have been observed in nearly two decades.  
 
2b. Methodology 
We employ Markov switching and threshold regression models. The Markov switching model considers the effects of the 
possibility of different oil price regimes and examines the relations between fluctuations in oil prices and changes in the 
dollar-won basis in these regimes. The threshold regression model is then used to determine or quantify appropriate range 
of oil price values that make up each regime. It does this by estimating the threshold level, wherever it exists and is 
significant, that separates the range of values of oil prices into high and low oil price regimes. It can also be viewed as a 
robustness check for the Markov switching model as it estimates the relations between changes in oil prices and dollar-won 
basis in the partitioned subsamples. We also implement a VAR model to explain the evolution of the response of dollar-
won basis to oil price shocks in the impulse-response sense.  
As a preliminary procedure, we first run a battery of tests for non-stationarity. Results obtained, not presented but available 
on request, show that the variables in levels are not stationary but become stationary after first differencing. To avoid issues 
of misspecification, it is the first-differenced variables, which are stationarized, that enter all models used for our analysis. 
To concretize how each model is applied, we sketch a Markov switching model and following this, we also present a 
threshold model. Both models are reported in the appendix. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Some arguments for monthly data and against other data sampling such as daily data are documented in existing studies including Bailey and Stulz 
(1990), Smith et al. (1993), Sharma (2007) and Charoenwong and Feng (2017). Some of these studies find that daily data suffer a great deal from unwanted 
noise content while others argue that such data are more susceptible to residual mean misspecification. We look to lessen the disadvantages of unwanted 
noise in our analysis as the noise can play a big role to blur the signal of relationships we seek and make it cumbersome to separate the signal from noise. 
At monthly data series, the noise content dies away, and monthly data series is ideal as it smooths out unnecessary volatility from excessive noise and 
makes signals more tractable.  Monthly data also eases modelling, easier to identify changes in trends in relationships, and better for strategic long-range 
analysis such as the long-term oil contracts that importers often embark upon. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3538870
3. Empirical results 
 
To implement the empirical analysis, we estimate the Markov switching and threshold models motivated above. We first 
estimate the Markov switching model. Subsequently, we perform a sample splitting analysis using a dummy variable which 
we then finally formalize in a threshold model setting. Below, we present the results of Markov switching model for our data2. 
Following this, we display the observational dummy variable analysis results and then the results from the threshold analysis. 
    Table 1a: Markov switching results of changes in oil prices on fluctuations in the dollar-won basis 
  
 
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 1 Regime 2 
Oil 2.510*** 0.110 2.130*** -0.030 -0.120 1.30* 1.080 -0.117 
 
(0.870) (0.190) (0.810) (0.180) (0.180) (0.79)  (0.730) (0.186) 
Exchange rate 
 
-0.150*** -0.150*** -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.100*** -0.100*** 
   
(0.040) (0.040)  (0.039) (0.039)  (0.040) (0.040) 
CDS 
    
-0.378*** -0.378*** -0. 385*** -0.385*** 
     
(0.102) (0.102) (0.101) (0.101) 
Libor – OIS      -0.424*** -0.424*** 
       
(0.163) (0.163) 
      
 
  
         
         
Constant -3.19 0.74 -2.5 0.55 0.09 -1.55 -1.31 0.05 
 
(7.34) (0.96) (6.77) (0.93) (0.93) (6.36) (5.82) (0.94) 
Sigma 4.01 2.38 3.93 2.35 2.34 3.86 3.77 2.35 
 
(0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) 
Note: Changes in oil prices (Oil) is the regime dependent regressor; *, **, *** means significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels. Standard error in parenthesis 
Table 1b: Transition probabilities between states (regimes) and expected duration per state 
 
Transition probabilities 
 
Expected durations (months) 
 
State 1 State 2 
  
State 1 State 2 
 
State 1 0.96 0.04 
  
23.80 49.35 
 
State 2 0.02 0.98 
     
 
Figure 2: Probability to be in each regime (one regime where oil prices exert positive basis effect & another where 
effect is negative) and the dates corresponding to the probability of being in these regimes 
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Note: The regime of positive oil-basis relations corresponds to periods of active currency-hedging; that is, when generally high levels of oil prices lead to a rise 
in currency hedging that tightens the basis from a positive oil price change. Whereas a negative oil-basis relation matches with inactive currency-hedging, i.e. 
when oil prices are so depressed that they do not trigger the type of active currency hedging that tightens the basis from a positive oil price change. In the first 
graph (on the left), the probability of being in a state corresponding to the period 2008 to around 2013 is the greatest while the probability of being in a state 
corresponding to the period from 2014 is the least. The second graph (on the right), however, is a mirror image of the first graph. It reverses outcomes from the 
first graph and reveals that the period from 2014 now corresponds to the highest probability whereas earlier periods, particularly between 2008 to 2013, has the 
least probability. Thus, the first graph represents a state that characterizes high oil prices while the second graph displays a state of low oil prices. In a high oil 
price regime, the probability of being in a low oil price state is low. This explains why the probability is very high during historic periods of high oil prices and 
low in periods of depressed oil prices. Conversely, in a low oil price state, the probability of being in a high oil price state is low, which is why the probability is 
very high during historic periods of low oil prices and low in periods of high oil prices. This result is robust: we also control for other variables that have been 
found to influence the dollar-won basis and find that our results, particularly the behavior of the probabilities, are largely robust.   
The results displayed above are those from the Markov switching regression model. As the results show, the relations 
between changes in oil prices and dollar-won basis is in general not the same in any two regimes. In one regime, there is 
evidence that a rise in oil prices induces tighter dollar-won basis, which implies active currency hedging in the swap market. 
This is the high oil price regime. In the other regime, there is either a negative or insignificant relation between changes in 
oil prices and dollar-won basis, suggesting there is no evidence of active currency hedging in the swap market. This is the 
low oil price regime. The Markov switching specification therefore supports the existence of two regimes: one where there 
is active hedging in the currency swap market and another where hedging is inactive. Thus, the response of the basis to 
changes in oil prices are generally different in both regimes. One reason for the generally different outcomes in the two 
regimes could be explained by the partial hedging sometimes employed by Korean entities (Hahm, Shin & Shin, 2014). 
Importers of oil in Korea have an incentive to hedge in an environment of elevated oil prices whereas exporters of refined 
and other products have little or no incentive to hedge. This imbalance puts a net upward pressure on the dollar-won basis, 
making it to tighten when oil prices increase in a high regime. Conversely, in a low oil price regime, Korean exporters of 
refined and other products, especially those whose costs are majorly in the won, are more motivated to hedge when export 
revenues in dollars shrink while oil importers have little or no incentive to hedge. Thus, the basis widens even when oil 
prices increase in a low regime. 
The transition probability matrix and expected durations are displayed in Table 1b. Looking at the transition probabilities, 
there appears to be considerable state-dependence, with a high probability of remaining in the regime of origin. For the two 
states or regimes, the probabilities of remaining in the same state are significantly high and dominate the probability of 
moving to a new state. For instance, the probabilities of remaining in state 1 and state 2 - if the system is most recently in 
the same state - are 0.96 and 0.98 respectively, strictly dominating the probabilities of moving to a new state. In addition, 
the expected duration to be in a state before a brief movement to another state is 24 for state 1 and 49 for state 2.  
Finally, as shown in the first graph in Fig. 2, the probability of being in a state is persistently high in the periods from 2008 
to 2013 and lowest from around 2014. The periods of low probability correspond to historic periods of depressed oil prices 
while the period of high probability corresponds to historic periods of elevated oil prices. This state thus depicts the high 
oil price regime. Conversely, in the second graph, historic periods of low oil prices have the highest probability of being in 
that state while periods of low probability correspond to historic periods of elevated oil prices. This suggests that the state 
depicts a low oil price regime. Overall, the predicted probabilities of being in low and high states of oil prices coincide quite 
nicely with historic periods of elevated and depressed levels of oil prices.  
4. Classifying high and low regimes by observation and using formal threshold models 
So far, we have demonstrated the existence of two regimes or states of the levels of oil prices in which the effect of changes 
in oil prices on the currency hedging behavior using Dollar-won basis can be distinct. In this section, we attempt to 
empirically quantify what constitutes high and low regimes or states of oil price levels. We begin by choosing a 
predetermined threshold value, based on observations from the data, which we use to split the data samples into high and 
low oil price regimes. Following this, we formalize the analysis by using the previously exposited threshold model to 
econometrically estimate, rather than impose, the appropriate threshold levels of oil prices which split the data into the 
regimes of high and low oil prices. 
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4.1 Regime characterization by observation and using dummy variables 
Fig. 3 below redisplays the rolling correlation between changes in oil prices and dollar-won basis together with the evolution 
of oil prices in the international commodities market. As previously revealed, the link between changes in oil prices and 
Dollar-won basis appears to be segmented into two regimes where, on the one hand, the link is positive and, on the other 
hand, the link is negative. 
Figure 3: Rolling correlation of changes in oil prices and dollar-won basis (LHS); oil prices (RHS) 
  
 
By and large, by observing both graphs, we see that periods of elevated oil price levels, mostly beyond $55, coincide with 
a positive link between changes in oil prices and dollar-won basis, whereas periods of low levels of oil prices, beneath the 
$55 mark, show a weak or negative link between changes in oil prices and dollar-won basis. Accordingly, we set a threshold 
level of around $55. When oil prices exceed this value, we are in the high regime of oil prices. In this regime, the link 
between changes in oil prices and dollar-won basis should be positive. On the other hand, when oil prices are below this 
level, we are in the regime of low oil prices and the link between changes in oil prices and dollar-won basis should be weak 
or negative. To examine the validity of this observation, we run a standard regression model wherein we introduce a dummy 
variable together with the interaction between the dummy variable and changes in oil prices. This is aimed at investigating 
the observed links between changes in oil prices and Dollar-won basis in the different regimes identified for oil prices.  
Our dummy variable takes a value of 1 when oil prices are in the proposed high regime (above $55), while it takes a value 
of 0 for oil prices in the low regime (below $55). The baseline regression can thus be specified as: 𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑋𝑡 × 𝐷𝑡) + 𝜖𝑡                                                                                  (1) 
where 𝑋𝑡 and 𝑌𝑡 represent changes in oil prices and Dollar-won basis, 𝐷𝑡 = {1    𝑖𝑓 𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 > $550  𝑖𝑓 𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 ≤ $55  
and 𝜕𝑌𝑡𝜕𝑋𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑡 
Note that, in this specification, 𝛽1 represents the link between changes in oil prices and dollar-won basis when oil prices are 
in the low regime, i.e. below $55; it does not measure the overall main effect. 𝛽3 is the differential effect of changes in oil 
prices on Dollar-won basis when oil prices are in the high regime, i.e. more than $55, over when they are in the low regime. 
Meanwhile, 𝛽2 is the coefficient of the dummy variable and 𝜖𝑡 is the standard idiosyncratic effort term. The results are 
displayed in the table below. 
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 Table 2: Effect of changes in oil prices on the basis: the role of prevailing levels of oil prices 
 
dollar-won (KRWUSD) basis 𝑶𝒊𝒍 -1.19 
 
(1.01) 𝑫𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚 -6.99 
 
(4.99) 𝑶𝒊𝒍 ×  𝑫𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚 2.96*** 
 
(1.07) 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 4.41 
 
(4.20) 𝑹𝟐 0.11 𝑵 199 
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1%. Standard error in parenthesis. The dummy variable takes a value of 1 when oil prices are above $55 and 0 
when they are below. The $55 is imposed by inspection. This will be put to a more stringent verification test using formal threshold regression models. 
As shown in Table 2, the coefficient on the interaction term (𝑶𝒊𝒍 ×  𝑫𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚) turns out convincingly positive and 
significant for the basis. Each regression uses a basis at a different maturity which helps to provide additional source of 
robustness. Column (1) uses the 1-year basis while column (2) is based on the 5-year basis. The main result is that the 
interaction term, which shows how changes in oil prices may influence dollar-won basis is positive. Moreover, the 
interaction term for the 1-year basis is much more significant, at the 1% level, and provides support for the finding that 
changes in oil prices have a stronger positive impact on the 1-year than 5-year basis when oil prices are in the high regime.  
On the other hand, the dummy variable, which indicates the prevailing regime of oil prices, is itself insignificant and 
sometimes even changes sign whereas the sign of the interaction term holds firm. This could in part be due to the interaction 
term capturing an important hedging decision taken when prevailing levels of oil prices have attained a certain state — that 
is, reaching certain levels of oil prices may be a trigger for subsequent hedging decisions, and is not the decision in and of 
itself. Remarkably, the coefficient on changes in oil prices, which in our specification measures the link between changes 
in oil prices and dollar-won basis in the low oil price regime, turns out negative and displays considerable variation in 
significance even when the positive relation between changes in oil prices and dollar-won basis continues to hold—clearly 
making it vital to look at the links between changes in oil prices and dollar-won basis at different states of oil prices.  
Overall, the results confirm that depressed levels of oil prices can lessen the need to engage in currency hedging in the 
currency swap market, which explains the negative or insignificant links documented between changes in oil prices and 
Dollar-won basis. Meanwhile, elevated levels of oil prices can act as a trigger for significant currency hedging in the swap 
market, which potentially explains the strong and positive relation observed between changes in oil prices and dollar-won 
basis during periods of elevated oil price levels. Thus, we argue that oil prices beyond $55 can act as a trigger for agents to 
hedge in the swap market. Our findings reinforce the view that the effects of changes in oil prices on the basis would depend 
in some ways on the prevailing state or regime of oil prices, consistent with the results we earlier obtained. 
4.1.1 Inclusion of additional controls 
In the literature, the strong negative effect of fluctuations in dollar exchange rates and sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) 
on changes in cross-currency basis swaps is well known. It is one of the few consistent results to have emerged in studies 
on the persistent deviations from covered interest parity. In this light, one could argue that the reason changes in oil prices 
appears significant in our analysis is because changes in exchange rates and sovereign CDS have not been controlled for. 
Thus, for further robustness checks, we sequentially add changes in oil prices followed by changes in CDS to the list of 
predictors in our baseline regression. We report our results in Table 3. 
 
 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3538870
Table 3: Effect of changes in oil prices on the basis – robustness checks based on the dummy variable regression 
 
dollar-won (KRWUSD) basis dollar-won (KRWUSD) basis 𝑶𝒊𝒍 -1.35 -1.79** 
 
(0.88) (0.84) 𝑫𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚 -4.47 -4.21 
 
(4.39) (4.16) 𝑶𝒊𝒍 ×  𝑫𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚 2.01** 2.33*** 
 
(0.95) (0.91) 𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆 -0.66*** -0.28*** 
 
(0.09) (0.06) 𝑪𝑫𝑺 -- -0.43*** 
 
-- (0.09) 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 2.60 2.50 
 
(3.70) (3.50) 𝑹𝟐 0.32 0.39 𝑵 199 199 
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1%. Standard error in parenthesis. The dummy variable takes a value of 1 when oil prices are above $55 and 0 
when they are below. The $55 is imposed by inspection. This will be put to a more stringent verification test using formal threshold regression models. 
Interestingly, including both variables leads to a couple of reinforcing results. First, the interaction term remains strongly 
positive and significant, particularly for the basis. Second, the coefficient on changes in oil prices, that is the non-interaction 
term, remains negative, though still not always statistically significant. This implies that there is no evidence that changes 
in Dollar-won basis are strongly linked with changes in oil prices when oil prices are in the low regime – suggesting that 
hedging against adverse currency movement when oil prices are in a depressed state is unpopular. As expected, changes in 
exchange rates and CDS enter significantly and negatively in most of regressions. The interaction between changes in oil 
prices and the dummy variable, representing the prevailing state of oil prices, remains robust.  
As a final robustness check, we also included changes in Libor – OIS spread to capture direct dollar funding pressure in the 
dollar cash market. This variable is among the few consistently significant determinants of changes in the cross-currency 
basis over time across countries. The results are displayed in Table 4 below. 
 
Table 4: Effect of changes in oil prices on the basis – further robustness checks based on the dummy variable regression 
 
dollar-won 
(KRWUSD) basis 
dollar-won 
(KRWUSD) basis 
dollar-won 
(KRWUSD) basis 𝑶𝒊𝒍 -1.35 -1.79** -1.07 
 
(0.88) (0.84) (0.82) 𝑫𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚 -4.47 -4.21 -2.49 
 
(4.39) (4.16) (3.98) 𝑶𝒊𝒍 × 𝑫𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚 2.01** 2.33*** 1.47* 
 
(0.95) (0.91) (0.88) 𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆 -0.66*** -0.28*** -0.21*** 
 
(0.09) (0.06) (0.06) 𝑪𝑫𝑺 -- -0.43*** -0.47*** 
 
-- (0.09) (0.09) 𝑳𝒊𝒃𝒐𝒓 –  𝑶𝑰𝑺 -- -- -0.48*** 
   
(0.10) 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 2.60 2.50 1.36 
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 3.70 3.50 3.34 𝑹𝟐 0.32 0.39 0.45 𝑵 199 199 199 
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1%. Standard error in parenthesis. The dummy variable takes a value of 1 when oil prices are above $55 and 0 
when they are below. The $55 is imposed by inspection. This will be put to a more stringent verification test using formal threshold regression models. 
The results, reported in Table 4, show that previous findings remain unaltered. The results continue to support the finding 
that prevailing levels of oil prices provide additional insight into how changes in oil prices impact currency hedging 
decisions and hence movements in KRW cross-currency basis. Finally, a look at the results, especially for the basis, reveals 
that despite including changes in exchange rate as a control, changes in oil prices still have a positive and significant effect 
on changes in Dollar-won basis. This suggests that the effects of oil prices on Dollar-won basis are not only through 
variations in exchange rates.  Indeed, the effects can emanate, for example, from the investing and hedging activities of 
large reserve banks or sovereign wealth funds of emerging markets that are major crude oil exporters and that experience a 
surge in investible US dollars during high oil price regimes.  
4.2 Regime characterization using formal threshold models 
In the preceding section, we identify by observation a potential threshold level of $55 for oil prices and use this threshold 
level to quantify and classify or characterize what qualifies as high and low oil price regimes. We then introduce a dummy 
variable to help in ascertaining how changes in oil prices and Dollar-won basis are related in the different regimes. In this 
section, we formalize this exercise by using the threshold regression model motivated in section 3. The model provides a 
more rigorous way, rather than mere observation or inspection, to econometrically determine the value of the appropriate 
threshold level, characterize the high and low regimes and examine how changes in oil prices and dollar-won basis are 
related in both regimes.   
Our threshold specification includes lagged dependent variable, the purpose of which is to incorporate a partial adjustment 
for any mean reverting behavior in changes in the basis. The negative lagged dependent variable indicates a reversion 
towards an equilibrium position, consistent with the stationarity of changes in the basis which is the dependent variable. 
The lagged dependent variable also indirectly captures and controls for all variables that influenced changes in basis in the 
previous month but not explicitly included in the model. See Keele & Kelly (2006) for a persuasive exposition of several 
benefits of specifying lagged dependent variable as a regressor. As a robustness exercise, we also sequentially include 
previous control variables. We report our results in Table 5. 
Table 5: Threshold analysis of oil price changes on dollar-won basis. Threshold variable is level of oil prices 
 
dollar-won 
(KRWUSD) basis 
dollar-won 
(KRWUSD) basis 
dollar-won 
(KRWUSD) basis 
dollar-won 
(KRWUSD) basis 
Lagged dollar-won basis -0.10 -0.06 -0.10* -0.09* 
 (0.06) (0.059) (0.06) (0.05) 
Oil 
    
Low regime  -4.87*** -2.21*** -2.51*** -2.31*** 
 
(1.60) (0.88) (0.92) (0.88) 
High regime 1.74*** 1.12*** 0.67** 0.58* 
 
(0.36) (0.36) (0.34) (0.32) 
Threshold estimate 46.73*** 55.57*** 53.49* 53.49* 
F-statistic for threshold 16.33 13.06 10.44 7.78 
Bootstrap p-value for threshold 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.10 
     
Controls     
Exchange rate -0.39*** -0.24*** -0.18*** 
  
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
CDS 
  
-0.45*** -0.46*** 
   
(0.09) (0.09) 
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LIBOR-OIS 
  
-0.49*** 
    
(0.10) 
Samples in high regime 169 139 139 w 
Samples in Low regime   29   59 60 m 
     
     𝑹𝟐 0.14 0.32 0.40 0.47 
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1%. Standard error in parenthesis. Threshold variable is oil price level. Estimated threshold values (threshold estimate) are displayed. 
High regime corresponds to the sample partition for which oil prices are above the threshold estimate, otherwise it is low regime. The estimated threshold value of the 
level of oil prices ranges from $47 to $56 with a median of around $55. 
 
Interestingly, as shown in Column 2, the estimated threshold value of the level of oil prices is around $55; this is largely in 
agreement with the threshold level imposed by observation, providing some support for the threshold level obtained by 
observation. We also find that the estimated threshold level of oil prices is statistically significant. The level of oil prices 
acts as sample-splitting (or threshold) variable which separates the samples into the high and low oil price regimes. This 
allows for the possibility of the effects of changes in oil prices on the dollar-won basis to potentially take distinct values 
depending on whether the level of oil prices is smaller (low oil price regime) or larger (high oil price regime) than the 
estimated threshold level of oil prices. Thus, the result supports the presence of threshold effect or different regimes in the 
effect of changes in oil prices on the basis, consistent with findings from the regime switching analysis. We now examine 
the effects of changes in oil prices on the basis of each regime or sample split to assess whether they are consistent with the 
view that the effects are generally not congruent in both regimes.    
Table 5 displays the results in both regimes using the level of oil prices as the threshold variable or regime splitting cut off. 
As shown in the table, the median threshold estimate is around $55, and the test of no threshold effect yields a significant 
p-value. Thus, there is evidence of different regimes and the sample can be split into two groups. Periods with oil prices of 
more than the range of estimated threshold value are classified into high-oil price group (i.e. normal or elevated levels of 
oil prices in the market) while the ones with smaller values are classified into low-oil price group (i.e. low or depressed 
levels of oil prices). 
 
Additionally, the coefficient on changes in oil prices is positive and significant for the high oil-price regime while it is 
negative and significant for the low-oil price regime. This suggests that the effects of changes in oil prices on dollar-won 
basis are not uniform across all levels of oil prices. They are non-linear and dependent on the regime of oil prices and the 
positive or tightening impact on dollar-won basis from increases in oil prices only kicks in after oil prices have exceeded a 
threshold level, consistent with the findings from the dummy variable regression analysis based on observation threshold. 
It is after oil prices have exceeded certain estimated threshold levels and transitioned into the high price regime that the 
kind of hedging decision which leads to tighter dollar-won basis begins to take place in the swap market. Until then, either 
such hedging does not fully occur, or it occurs in the reverse direction which leads to wider, rather than tighter, dollar-won 
basis. The other column reports the results after including control variables. The upshot of these results is that the threshold 
effects and previous conclusions generally remain intact, but the estimates appear slightly tempered as controls increase.  
Overall, we find evidence that the effects of changes in oil prices on the dollar-won basis is regime-dependent. The threshold 
analysis quantifies and then characterizes what constitutes a high and low oil price regime. Using the threshold model, 
which supports the earlier observational analysis, we estimate a threshold oil price level of around $55. Oil prices below 
this level constitute the low oil price regime whereas oil prices above this level make up the high oil price regime. We show 
that hedging only begins to take place in ways that lead to tighter dollar-won basis when oil prices exceed the estimated 
threshold level and transition into the high oil price regime. This also seems to suggest that the currency hedging strategy 
of buying dollars forward occurs after oil prices have exceeded certain threshold levels of oil prices. Below this level, it is 
probable that the reverse hedging strategy which leads to wider dollar-won basis is more dominant. 
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5. Impulse response 
The main goal of this section is to examine the response of the dollar-won basis to oil price shocks. We specify a VAR 
model. In our specification of the VAR model, the ordering employed is such that shocks to crude oil prices influence 
changes in the dollar-won basis, but shocks to the dollar-won basis do not affect oil prices contemporaneously in the 
international commodities markets. This ordering reflects the view that oil prices are globally determined but can influence 
the decisions of oil importers; oil importers take prices as given and react to changes in or expected changes in oil prices 
because they do not have the power to influence these price changes in the international commodities markets3.  
 
5a. Main results 
i. Impulse responses 
This section presents the impulse responses of the dollar-won basis to shocks in oil prices. To this end, we estimate the 
above VAR model for the dollar-won basis (K1). After running the first stage VAR, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
suggests a lag length of 7. Accordingly, we choose this lag to specify the VAR, although we note that in an unreported 
robustness checks, we find that our main inference is largely robust to different lag lengths and not significantly altered. 
 
Figure 4: Response changes in dollar-won basis (K1) to changes in oil prices (OIL)                                                                              
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Note: Solid lines (blue) are estimates of the impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock estimated using our VAR specification. Dashed lines (red) are the 95 percent 
confidence intervals. The vertical axis highlights the impulse responses of changes in the variables. Horizontal axis denotes months after a shock has occurred. For instance, 
a value of 1 in the horizontal axis will denote the response of the variable on the vertical axis to a shock that occurred 1 month earlier, i.e. the response to a shock one month 
after the shock took place. 
Fig. 4 shows the responses of the dollar-won basis (K1) to a 1 standard deviation shock to oil price changes (OIL). A positive 
shock to OIL generates a positive impact response in K1, which implies that positive oil price shocks tightens K1. It tightens 
K1 basis by around 6 basis points on impact and continues the tightening in the subsequent two to three months. The peak 
is equivalent to a 6-basis point tightening which is stable until after the second year when it begins to collapse. This positive 
response is significant at the 5% level and continues for nearly 3 periods (months) before it turns insignificant by the third 
month. The significant positive and insignificant negative responses subsequently reversed, turning negative and significant 
                                                          
3 Note, we do not employ long run identifying assumptions based on structural models as there is no economic theory on whose back restrictions 
can be imposed to achieve identification of parameters of structural VAR 
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after five months of the realization of the shock. This result echoes the previous findings and suggests that the response of 
the dollar-won basis to oil price shocks is dynamic and can either be positive or negative, depending on the period under 
study. By way of contrast, we note, as shown in Fig. 2, that shocks to the dollar-won basis fail to generate any statistically 
significant or economically meaningful response from changes in oil prices. 
To summarize the results of the impulse response exercise, we find that the responses of the dollar-won cross-currency basis 
to oil prices shocks is dynamic and can either be positive, which implies a tighter dollar-won cross-currency basis from a 
positive oil price shock, or negative, which implies wider basis, across time. This provides evidence that there are certain 
periods wherein positive oil price shocks may lead to tighter basis, indicating active currency hedging activity in the dollar-
won cross-currency swap market, or a negative or insignificant response of the basis, corresponding to inactive hedging or 
even opposite hedging activity in the dollar-won swap market.  
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6. Conclusion 
Focusing on Korea, a major oil importer among G-20 countries, we examine the effect of changes in oil prices on the dollar-
won basis swap spreads. We find evidence that an increase in oil prices is positively associated with the dollar-won basis only when oil prices 
have transitioned into a high regime, which implies that oil importers hedge against adverse movements in exchange rates when oil prices are 
in a high regime.  However, when oil prices are low, such as during periods of depressed oil prices like those observed few years ago, we find 
no evidence that tighter dollar-won basis results from an increase in oil prices. Our results suggest that oil importers do not currency-hedge 
when oil prices are already in a depressed state, but they actively hedge against adverse exchange rate movements when oil prices have 
transitioned to a high regime.  
Using threshold models, we formally verify the existence of threshold effects which enable us to quantify the regimes. We 
argue that it is when oil prices exceed $55 that oil importers become triggered to currency-hedge in the cross-currency swap 
markets, leading to a positive link between fluctuations in oil prices and changes in the dollar-won cross-currency basis. 
Much below this level, we find little or no evidence of active currency hedging in the swap market as reflected in a negative 
and sometimes insignificant effects of changes in oil prices on the basis. In a standard impulse-response framework, we find that 
the response of the dollar-won basis to oil prices shocks is dynamic; it can be positive, which implies a tighter dollar-won 
basis from positive oil price shocks, or negative, which implies a wider basis from positive shocks to oil prices. Thus, 
periods exist wherein positive oil price shocks lead to tighter basis, and other periods where such shocks can lead to either 
a wider basis or no significant response.  
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7. Appendix 
 
i. Markov switching model 
The Markov switching regression is suitable for our data and allows states to switch according to a Markov process. As an 
illustration, consider, for simplicity and without loss of generality, the problem of analyzing the links between {𝑋𝑡 , 𝑌𝑡}, a 
bivariate time series. Our analysis is based on the following Markov switching regression model: 𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛽𝑠𝑋𝑡 + 𝜖𝑠,𝑡 
where 𝑌𝑡 represents changes in the dollar-won basis swap spread, 𝛼𝑠 is the state dependent intercept, 𝑋𝑡 represents changes 
in oil prices, 𝛽𝑠 is the state-dependent coefficient which measures the effect of fluctuations in oil prices on the cross-currency 
basis in different states or regimes and 𝜖𝑠,𝑡 is the state-dependent error term such that 𝜖𝑠,𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑠2). 
Partitioning the above into 2 states – state 1 and state 2, we have:  𝛼𝑠 = 𝛼1,  𝛽𝑠 =  𝛽1 and 𝜖𝑠,𝑡 = 𝜖1,𝑡 ~𝑁(0, 𝜎1 2)  if s = 1 𝛼𝑠 = 𝛼2,  𝛽𝑠 =  𝛽2 and 𝜖𝑠,𝑡 = 𝜖2,𝑡 ~𝑁(0, 𝜎2 2)  if s = 2 
The nature of the current state is not known with certainty but estimates of the probability of currently being in one of the 
states can be estimated. Let 𝛿𝑖𝑗, where 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1 or 2, represent estimate of the probability of moving from state i to state j, 
that is, the probability of being in state j in the current period given that the process was in state i in the previous period, 
then the matrix of the probability of transitioning from one state to another can be written as: 
𝑀 = (𝛿11       𝛿12 𝛿21     𝛿22 ) 
where 𝛿12 = 1 − 𝛿11,    𝛿22 = 1 − 𝛿21      𝛿11 gives the probability of remaining in state 1 if previously in state 1, and  𝛿12 is thus the complement of 𝛿11 and it 
represents the probability of not remaining in state 1 (i.e. going to state 2) if previously in state 1. Similarly, 𝛿22 is the 
probability of remaining in state 2 if previously in state 2 and 𝛿21 is the probability of not remaining in state 2 (i.e. reverting 
back to state 1) if previously in state 2. 𝛿21 is thus a complement of 𝛿22 and so 𝛿21 = 1 − 𝛿22. In our application, the two 
states can be elevated and depressed states of oil prices wherein we study the effects of changes in oil prices on the currency 
hedging decisions (i.e. variations in the USDKRW cross-currency basis) in these states. 
 
ii. Threshold model 
Consider a threshold regression with two states or regimes characterized by a threshold 𝛾 which is the estimated level of oil 
prices serving as a switching variable that separates the data into two observable states. We can write this more instructively 
as: 𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑋𝑡 + 𝑍𝑡𝜓1 + 𝜖𝑡         if  tht ≤ 𝛾 
 𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽2𝑋𝑡 + 𝑍𝑡𝜓2 +  𝜖𝑡         if  tht > 𝛾 
where 𝑌𝑡 is the dependent variable representing changes in Dollar-won basis; 𝑋𝑡  is a vector of regressors or controls possibly 
containing lagged value of the dependent variable; 𝑍𝑡 represents the variable of interest (that is, changes in oil prices); tht 
is the threshold variable (i.e. level of oil prices) and 𝜖𝑡 is IID error with mean 0 and variance 𝜎2. 
To partition the samples into different states or regimes, the estimated value of the threshold (𝛾) is required. The estimated 𝛾 must be within the range of values of the threshold variable tht. To estimate the threshold value, we minimize the least 
squares of the following regression with 𝑇 observations and two states:  𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽 𝑋𝑡 + 𝑍𝑡𝜓1𝐼(tht ≤ 𝛾) + 𝑍𝑡𝜓2𝐼(tht > 𝛾) + 𝜖𝑡         Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3538870
for a sequence of 𝑇1 values in tht, where 𝑇1 < 𝑇.  
The estimator for the threshold is given by: 𝛾 = arg min𝛾𝜖∇ 𝑆𝑇1(𝛾) 
where  ∇= (−∞, +∞),  
𝑆𝑇1(𝛾) = ∑[𝑌𝑡 − 𝛽 𝑋𝑡 + 𝑍𝑡𝜓1𝐼(tht ≤ 𝛾) + 𝑍𝑡𝜓2𝐼(tht > 𝛾)]2𝑇𝑡=1  
represents a 𝑇1 × 1 vector of sum of squared residuals and 𝛾 is a 𝑇1 × 1 vector of tentative thresholds. In the subsequent 
section below, we estimate the Markov switching and threshold models for our data. 
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9. Highlights 
 
• How do the cross-currency basis swap spreads of an oil-importing country change when oil prices rise?  
 
• For Korea, we document a striking new evidence that currency hedging positions, via forward buying of US dollars, are taken in the 
swap market when oil prices increase, and this goes hand-in-hand with tighter dollar-won cross-currency basis spreads. 
 
•  However, these positions are taken only after oil prices have exceeded certain threshold levels and transitioned into a high-price 
regime. Until then, the effect on the basis is either negative, or altogether muted.  
 
• This indicates that changes in the dollar-won basis and oil prices are dynamically related and regime dependent, where the relation 
is positive in one regime (high-price regime) but negative or insignificant in the other regime (low-price regime).  
 
• One implication of this finding for risk management in portfolio strategy is to take long positions in Korean bonds hedged into US 
dollars with cross-currency basis swaps as soon as oil prices begin to show signs of transitioning into a high-price regime, and to take 
an opposite position otherwise. 
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